Blockchain protocols exchange payment transactions securely, but their performance is limited by the need to achieve global consensus. Payment networks, as a second layer on top of blockchains, allow more efficient payments between parties. Existing payment networks, however, are fundamentally insecure: they assume synchronous blockchain access, i.e. that participants can write transactions to the blockchain within bounded time. As shown recently, attackers can delay transactions with current blockchains, which only offer besteffort write latencies, and thus steal funds.
Introduction
Cryptocurrencies [46, 70, 51, 53] enable secure transactions between participants using blockchain protocols. Current blockchain protocols have limited performance due to their need to achieve consensus for all transactions. For example, global throughput in Bitcoin [46] and Ethereum [70] is capped at a handful of transactions per second, and transactions take minutes or hours to be committed. Payment networks [21, 15, 50] have been proposed as a more performant second layer on top of the blockchain. They execute transactions off-chain, without writing to the underlying blockchain for every transaction, thus enabling much higher transaction throughput.
Existing payment network protocols [15, 50, 9] , however, are fundamentally insecure: they assume synchronous blockchain access under which participants must be able to write transactions to the blockchain within a bounded period of time τ. This makes these protocols vulnerable to attack: blockchains do not guarantee bounded write latencies, and transaction can be delayed by attackers, as demonstrated by recent attacks [54, 58, 27, 7, 29, 16, 28] . Existing payment network protocols therefore trade-off safety and liveness: funds are locked in escrow on the underlying blockchain during τ. If τ is small to reduce fund lock times, an attacker can more easily delay transactions to steal funds; if τ is large to make attacks more expensive, funds are inaccessible and unusable for longer periods of time.
We present Teechain, a new payment network that supports secure fund transfers on top of existing blockchains while requiring only asynchronous blockchain access. In contrast to existing proposals, Teechain makes no assumptions about bounded transaction write times to the blockchain, thus avoiding the trade-off between fund safety and liveness.
To achieve asynchronous blockchain access, Teechain exploits the support for trusted execution environments (TEEs) in commodity CPUs [23, 4] . TEEs are a hardware security feature that protects the confidentiality and integrity of code and data. Teechain uses TEEs to manage the funds in the payment network: it constructs a peer-to-peer decentralized network of TEEs, and assigns funds and balances across payment channels. As existing TEE implementations are vulnerable to compromise [67, 8, 45] , Teechain assumes a Byzantine failure model for TEEs. It uses a chain replication scheme combined with threshold secret sharing to be resilient against individual TEE compromises.
The design of Teechain makes three contributions: (C1) Asynchronous blockchain access. Teechain is the first payment network to operate with asynchronous blockchain access. It comprises two protocols: (i) a protocol for pointto-point payment channels in which two participants can ex-change funds; and (ii) a protocol for multi-hop payments that offers payments along paths of payment channels. As TEEs manage fund balances, Teechain achieves high transaction throughput and low latency by executing transactions as single message exchanges-unlike existing solutions. (C2) Dynamic deposit assignment. Teechain decouples the creation of fund deposits from payment channel establishment. As deposits are secured by TEEs, participants can create deposits in advance, dynamically assign them to channels upon establishment, and move them in and out of channels at runtime. Since deposit assignment does not require blockchain access, payment channels are established within seconds. (C3) Chain replication and threshold signatures. To replicate the in-memory TEE state, Teechain uses force-freeze chain replication, a new variant of chain replication that achieves high availability and strong consistency, while preventing roll-back and forking attacks. To account for TEE compromises [67] , Teechain assumes a Byzantine failure model for TEEs. After partitioning the state across multiple TEEs, it tolerates Byzantine failures by exploiting multisignature support of the underlying blockchain. To access funds, a sufficient number of TEE signatures are required.
We implement Teechain using Intel's SGX TEEs [22] and deploy it on the Bitcoin network.
1 In addition to supporting asynchronous blockchain access, Teechain performs significantly better than existing solutions: channel establishment takes seconds, as opposed to minutes or hours with previous solutions [15, 50] . Compared to the Lightning Network [37] , Teechain with two replicas achieves at least 33× higher transaction throughput with similar latencies, while placing fewer transactions on the underlying blockchain.
2 Secure Payment Networks for Blockchains
Blockchain protocols
In comparison to earlier payment systems [48, 69, 2], blockchain protocols, such as Bitcoin [46] and Ethereum [63] , are not operated by a central trusted entity; instead they execute a peer-to-peer replicated state machine that maintains an append-only ledger containing the history of all payment transactions in the network. As blockchain protocols must achieve consensus over the order of all transactions in the ledger, their throughput is limited. Past work tries to address their performance limitations, from alternatives to the chain structure [36, 63, 56 ] to different block generation techniques [17, 33, 47] ; others [42, 44, 18, 59 ] build on classical consensus protocols [13] or operate in permissioned settings [10, 20] . While all these proposals improve performance, none can reach the performance of direct payments that do not require global consensus. 1 An alpha release of Teechain can be found at: redacted for anonymity
Payment channels and networks
Payment channels [38, 43, 49, 15, 50] overcome the performance limitations of blockchains by allowing parties to exchange funds directly, off-chain, without having to use the blockchain for each transaction. Instead, transactions become message exchanges in which parties update the balances, or state, of the payment channel directly. Payment networks [50, 65, 40] chain multiple channels together to create multi-hop payment paths between parties that do not have a direct payment channel. This is necessary to support e-commerce scenarios in which buyers and sellers conduct transactions via intermediaries [1] . To prevent fund loss or theft, all channels in the path must update their balances in unison. Payment networks solve this by freezing funds during payment routing and monitoring the blockchain, which prevents other users from terminating channels freely [50] .
Existing payment networks, however, assume synchronous blockchain access-users must be able to write transactions to the blockchain within a bounded period of time, τ. This is to prevent old and stale channel states from being published on the blockchain to steal funds. For example, in Duplex Micropayment Channels [15] , time-locked transactions prevent older channel states from published before newer ones; in the Lightning Network [50] , users monitor the blockchain for old states, and if found, have a bounded amount of time to react.
Blockchain protocols, however, fail to bound write latencies: transactions can be delayed with little cost, as shown by recent attacks [58, 27, 29, 16, 28, 54] , making existing payment networks vulnerable to attack. When payment channels lock channel funds in escrow on the underlying blockchain [38, 15, 50, 43] during the synchronous time period, τ, there is a trade-off between security and liveness: if τ is small to reduce lock times, an attacker can more easily delay transactions to steal funds; if τ is large to make attacks more expensive, funds are inaccessible for larger periods of time.
Existing payment networks also suffer from long channel establishment times, and lack the ability to add and remove funds from payment channels dynamically [38, 50, 15] . While it is possible to redistribute funds between static groups of payment channels [9] , this limits fund redistribution to a fixed group of collaborating participants. REVIVE [32] rebalances payment channels by sending payments along cycles in a payment network but relies on synchronous blockchain access and locks funds statically to channels; Sprites [43] can add and remove funds to and from channels dynamically, but requires on-chain support for complex transaction constructs, which is incompatible with blockchains such as Bitcoin.
Trusted hardware and blockchains
Trusted execution environments (TEEs) [23, 4, 30, 31] have been used to improve the security and performance of blockchain protocols. TEEs provide confidentiality and integrity guarantees to code and data in a system, as long as the physical CPU is not breached. TEEs typically also support remote attestation [26, 24] , which allows remote parties to verify that a certain piece of software is running within a genuine TEE. Existing TEE implementations are vulnerable to side-channel attacks [8, 45] , and thus TEE compromises are possible [67] .
Tesseract [6] constructs a secure cryptocurrency exchange but is incompatible with payment networks. Other work focuses on the use of TEEs for smart contracts: TownCrier enables a secure data-feed for blockchain contracts [72] , Ekiden [14] offers a platform for privacy preserving smart contracts; Obscuro constructs a secure Bitcoin mixer using TEEs [66] ; TEEChan [38] uses TEEs to realize single-hop payment channels with limited lifetimes. It provides limited fault tolerance, requires synchronous blockchain access, does not support multi-hop payments, and cannot create payment channels instantly or dynamically assign deposits.
Threat model and problem statement
We assume a scenario in which mutually distrusting parties use a blockchain-based cryptocurrency to exchange funds. Parties are selfish and potentially malicious, i.e. if it benefits them, they may attempt to steal funds and deviate from the protocol. Parties may drop, send, record, modify, and replay messages. Parties may also collude with one another. The parties are connected via a network, with some parties behind firewalls or network address translation (NAT).
Our goal is to design an off-chain payment network that achieves high transaction throughput for secure multi-hop payments, while assuming asynchronous access to the underlying blockchain and Byzantine failures of all participants.
stantiation. Participants can associate deposits with channels dynamically to increase their balances. Since deposit association does not require blockchain access, payment channels can be established with low latency (see §7). Fig. 1 shows channel C1 containing deposits D1 and D2 from Alice, and deposit D3 from Bob. Some deposits may be unassociated with any channel (e.g. D5) and can be released from the network upon request. §4 describes deposit creation and association. Committee chains. As TEEs in Teechain control funds in volatile memory, crash failures can lead to fund loss, and TEE compromises [67] can lead to fund theft. To overcome crash and Byzantine failures, Teechain constructs committee chains that secure deposits and replicate deposit state in the network. Committee chains consist of replication chains of TEEs where the committee members control the private keys for a deposit (e.g. TEE A has a committee chain with 3 other TEEs that replicate deposit states D1 and D2). Teechain uses monetary incentives to motivate committee participation. For each payment, committee members takes a small, configurable fee. This enables Teechain to tolerate threshold TEE compromises. We describe committee chains in §6. TEE outsourcing. Users without a local TEE (e.g.Dave, Fig. 1 ), may participate in Teechain through TEE outsourcing: using a remote TEE in the network as a local TEE. For this, the user attests a remote TEE and provisions it with a shared secret key, giving them the same abilities as a local TEE user. To prevent having to trust remote TEE operators, Teechain (i) constructs committee chains using other TEEs; and (ii) uses monetary incentives to motivate availability.
Teechain payment channels
Teechain forms bidirectional payment channels using TEEs to allow participants to exchange funds directly. Teechain delegates fund ownership to the TEEs in the network through fund deposits. Participants instruct their TEEs to establish payment channels, associate funds with channels, execute payments, and terminate channels by generating settlement transactions for the blockchain.
Due to memory limitations of existing TEEs [22], Teechain does not maintain the complete blockchain in the TEE. As such, TEEs have no direct way of verifying transactions. Participants must therefore interact with the blockchain in four cases: (i) when funds are deposited into the network; (ii) when funds are released from the network; (iii) when a new deposit is approved and assigned to a channel; and (iv) when payment channels are terminated. In each case, interaction occurs without assuming bounded blockchain latencies.
Payment channel protocol
We present the Teechain payment channel protocol in Alg. 1. Immediate payment channel creation. Teechain allows payment channels to be created without blockchain interaction. To construct a payment channel, first, a secure network channel is established between two TEEs (newNetworkChannel, Alg. 1, line 15) using authenticated Diffie-Hellman [34] to provision keys (line 17); remote attestation ensures TEE validity. Authentication occurs through a unique public/private key pair generated securely by each TEE (line 1)-keys are exchanged out-of-band. Authentication in this manner prevents messages from being shared between multiple TEEs, avoiding state-forking attacks in which attackers maintain multiple different TEE states by forking and withholding messages.
Using the secure network channel, payment channels can be created. Both participants provide their TEEs with the remote public key and a cryptocurrency settlement address, i.e. an address to be paid upon channel settlement and deposit return (newPayChannel, line 18). The TEEs then associate this information with the channel and create a signed acknowledgement message (line 26), opening the channel (line 27). Dynamic deposit assignment. Teechain allows funds to be associated/dissociated with payment channels at runtime. A deposit is a transaction, txo, placed on the blockchain that spends funds into an m-out-of-n address, where the n addresses are TEE-owned address returned by command newAddr (line 32). For simplicity, Alg. 1 constrains deposits to be paid into 1-out-of-1 multisignature addresses. We outline the protocol for general m-out-of-n deposits in §6.1.
New deposits can be added at any time (newDeposit, line 36). The corresponding private keys to spend deposits are stored in the TEEs (line 34), allowing the funds to be released later (releaseDeposit, line 42). Before a deposit can be associated with a channel, the remote party must approve it (approveMyDeposit, line 48). Deposit approval allows participants to define the security parameters of their channels, i.e. how many transaction confirmations they require. Participants can validate other deposits in the network (line 58) and notify TEEs of deposit approval (line 59). Deposits only need to be approved once for each participant pair, and can be created and approved in advance of payment channel creation.
Unassociated deposits can be associated with a payment channel (associateMyDeposit, line 64). Channel balances are updated (line 70 and line 79) and the corresponding private key is shared with the remote TEE (line 73), enabling the remote to spend the deposit upon channel termination (line 72). Deposit dissociation works similarly (dissociateDeposit, line 90). To prevent double-spending, dissociation requires the remote TEE to acknowledge the request first (line 99) and to destroy its copy of the private key (line 104 generation of settlement transactions consistent with those of the prematurely terminated channel using PoPTs. As multiple settlement transactions may be generated for the same channel by different participants, Teechain generates conflicting blockchain transactions to ensure consistent termination states for all channels. Fig. 2 shows the messages exchanged between TEEs when Alice routes a payment to Bob via Payment Processor. Alg. 2 describes the protocol executed at each TEE. To issue the payment, Alice executes payMultihop (Alg. 2, line 3), locking the payment channels in the path by forwarding a lock request along the channels (Fig. 2 , stage 1 and Alg. 2, line 5). Channel locks prevent channels from being used for other payments and ensure sufficient balances. The TEEs in the path then update all channel states from pre-payment to postpayment state (Fig. 2 , stages 2-5 and Alg. 2, line 15-line 54). Once all payment channels are updated, the channel locks are released (Fig. 2, stage 6 and Alg. 2, line 55).
Multi-hop payment protocol
Proofs of premature termination (PoPT). At any time, a participant may eject (lines 60 and 66) from the protocol, prematurely terminating their payment channels. Teechain employs PoPTs during the update of channel balances to avoid inconsistent termination. When transitioning a set of payment channels from payment state X to Y , if a node prematurely terminates through eject (line 60), PoPTs ensure that all other nodes terminate at the same state. Teechain enforces that settlement transactions produced by channels in state X conflict with those of channels in Y . Hence, only transactions from either X or Y are accepted by the blockchain, but never both. TEEs operating channels in the conflicting state must be presented with a settlement transaction s of a channel settled in the opposite state; s acts as a PoPT to eject (line 66), authorizing the TEE to generate a new nonconflicting transaction to settle consistently (lines 70 and 72).
Enforcing transaction conflicts. For consistent channel settlement, Teechain must ensure that transactions in state X conflict with those in state Y . For blockchains offering expressive on-chain programmability, e.g. Ethereum, this can be achieved through a smart contract that associates settlement transactions for channels as part of a single multi-hop payment. For blockchains without smart contracts, e.g. Bitcoin, Teechain constructs an intermediate path settlement transaction, τ, that conflicts with individual pre-and post-payment transactions by spending the same deposits and settling all channels in the path at post-payment state. Using τ, channels can be updated from pre-to post-payment state securely, by moving to an intermediate state I between the transition. As I settles channels using τ, transitions from pre-payment state to I, and I to post-payment state can occur safely because τ conflicts with all individual settlement channel transactions. Termination consistency using τ and PoPTs. Using τ and PoPTs, Teechain settles channels consistently under premature termination. To construct τ, each TEE adds their channel deposits and post-payment balances (lock, line 11) and signs τ (sign, lines 14 and 19), producing τ. Upon receipt of τ (preUpdate, lines 21 and 26), each TEE prevents individual channel settlement, and only allows premature termination through τ. If all nodes receive τ successfully, the channel balances are updated to post-payment state (update, lines 32, 38 and 39), after which each TEE discards τ and allows termination of individual channels at post-payment state (line 64). Channels locks are then released (release, line 46).
We differentiate three cases in which a participant prematurely terminates the protocol: (i) stage lock or sign-the TEE generates pre-payment settlement transactions for its local channels (line 64), and the participant places them on the blockchain. All other participants use these transactions on the blockchain as PoPT for their TEEs (line 66) to settle their channels in pre-payment state (line 70); (ii) preUpdate or update-if a participant ejects, their TEE settles all channels using τ (line 65); and (iii) postUpdate or release-similar to (i), the TEE generates post-payment settlement transactions for its local channels (line 64) and the participant places them on the blockchain. Other participants use these transactions as PoPT for their TEEs (line 66) to settle their channels in post-payment state (line 72).
Overcoming channel lock contention
Locking payment channels during multi-hop payments ( §5.1) prevents concurrent payments along the channels in that path. To overcome this bottleneck, Teechain constructs temporary channels between TEEs, allowing other payments to execute in parallel along the same paths. If a primary channel experiences high contention, temporary channels are created automatically using unassociated deposits. This is possible because Teechain can immediately create new channels and dynamically assign deposits ( §4.1).
If a participant, Alice, wants to terminate any temporary channels, they can be merged back into a single primary channel: Alice (i) executes multi-hop payments in a cycle to herself along the primary and temporary channels until the temporary channels are at a neutral balance; and (ii) terminates the temporary channels off-chain through deposit dissociation ( §4.1). We evaluate temporary channel performance in §7.4.
Chain replication and threshold signatures
TEEs in Teechain secure private keys for deposits. TEE failures and compromises therefore pose a threat to fund safety. Teechain uses a new variant of chain replication [68] to protect against crash and Byzantine failures of TEEs. Chain replication offers high availability and strong consistency, without requiring all nodes to communicate with each other directly. In peer-to-peer networks, such as Teechain, this is advantageous to other protocols, such as Paxos [35] , because not all participants have direct connectivity due to network address translation (NAT) and firewalls. Force-freeze chain replication. Traditional chain replication replicates the state of a primary node to a set of backup replicas [68] , propagating state updates down the replication chain and allowing read access from any backup. Applying this approach naively to TEEs would make Teechain vulnerable to roll-back and state forking attacks-attackers could attain old states and transactions from a backup, continue to execute payments via the primary, and then terminate at a previous state to steal funds. To overcome this, Teechain uses a new force-freeze chain replication protocol that exploits the chain replication structure: if a read access occurs to a backup, the chain is broken, freezing all nodes at the current state, similar to how failures are handled: future updates are prevented, and all channels are settled and unused deposits releasedperformed by contacting any live nodes in the chain.
Alg. 3 shows the force-freeze chain replication protocol for creating a replication chain and executing state updates: to create a backup b, a new TEE is initialized and assigned to the tail t of an existing replication chain (assignAsBackupFor, Alg. 3, line 7). Upon initialization, b and t perform remote attestation (lines 4 and 9) and establish a secure network channel (see §4) to begin replicating state. All TEEs in the chain are kept synchronized by requiring an acknowledgement from the backup before any state updates occur (line 24): updates propagate down the chain, updating all backups, and once the primary receives an acknowledgement from its backup, it knows that all backups in the chain have been updated, and can proceed to update (line 25) and continue (line 27).
Committee chains for secure deposits
Teechain secures fund deposits against Byzantine TEE failures by combining force-freeze chain replication with threshold signatures [19] to construct committee chains. Committee chains distribute deposit state among multiple TEEs in the network and exploit m-out-of-n multisignature blockchain transactions to require threshold signatures to spend deposits. Committee deposit creation. Committee chains are constructed per fund deposit in Teechain: participants create deposits by spending funds into an m-out-of-n multisignature address on the blockchain, where m is the threshold number of signatures required to spend the deposit, and n the total number of committee members in that committee chain.
Alg. 1 shows the construction of 1-out-of-1 deposits, where only a single private key is used to secure each deposit. The protocol for constructing general m-out-of-n deposits is identical: first, a committee chain is constructed according to Alg. 3; next, each of the n TEEs in the committee chain return return ack /* Ack s update */ a cryptocurrency address from command newAddr (Alg. 1, line 32); and, finally, participants spend funds into an m-outof-n multisignature address for the committee members, and present the deposit to their primary TEE (newDeposit, Alg. 1, line 36), which notifies all the TEEs in the committee chain Dynamic deposit assignment. Deposits can be created independently of payment channels ( §4) and associated/dissociated with channels at runtime. Before channel association, deposits must first be approved by the remote party in the channel (approveMyDeposit, Alg. 1, line 48). This allows participants to accept deposits only if the values of m and n are appropriate. The security requirements can be defined in the local TEE of each participant, allowing automatic deposit approval. When selecting values, there are multiple considerations: (i) 1-out-of-1 deposits require the private key for the deposit to be shared with the remote TEE in the channel on association (Alg. 1, line 73). This avoids having to trust the counter party entirely for availability (see §4.1); (ii) 1-out-ofm committee deposits offer fault tolerance against crash but not Byzantine failures; and (iii) in the general case, to spend committee deposits, a participant must acquire a sufficient number of signatures for each deposit. Having many deposits per payment channel, with large values of m for each deposit, impacts blockchain transactions sizes; we explore this in §7.5. Independent committee updates. Payment channels may contain multiple deposits, and each deposit may have a separate and independent committee chain. Teechain avoids having to update multiple committee chains atomically when participants issue large payments that affect the states of multiple deposits. Teechain enforces that, for any large payment that spans several deposits, the committee chains for those deposits must be identical, and thus the deposits state updates can be batched together securely. If a large payment spans deposits owned by separate committee chains, the payment is broken down into smaller payments, only affecting one deposit at a time, and executed sequentially. Having many deposits in a payment channel, each with distinct committee members, affects performance, which we evaluate in §7.2.
Persistant storage for crash faults
For users who do not wish to operate committee chains and instead trust TEEs to be secure against compromise entirely, Teechain provides crash fault tolerance by persisting TEE and deposit state to local storage; upon failure, state can be reloaded to settle channels and return deposits. To overcome roll-back and state forking attacks, Teechain uses hardware monotonic counters [25] and secure data sealing provided by the TEE [3]. Since Intel SGX implementations currently throttle monotonic counters to ten increments per second [57, 41] , persistant storage for crash fault tolerance is limited to ten operations per second. We overcome this using client-side transaction batching, as discussed and shown in §7.2.
Evaluation
We evaluate the security of Teechain ( §7.1) and the performance of payment channels ( §7.2), multi-hop payments ( §7.3) large-scale payment networks ( §7.4), and the on-blockchain cost ( §7.5). Implementation. We implement Teechain using Intel SGX for the Bitcoin blockchain. Our implementation uses the Linux Intel SGX SDK v2.1 [22] and a subset of Bitcoin core [61] . We provide an alpha release of our implementation online at: [redacted for anonymity]. Teechain consists of 83,000 lines of C/C++ code inside the TEE, and 5,000 lines of untrusted code. As the Linux SGX SDK does not currently support monotonic counters on all hardware [22], we emulate them with a delay of 100 ms, as reported elsewhere [57, 41] . Baseline comparison. To measure performance, we define throughput as the number of transactions sent per second, and latency as the time from the moment a payment is issued until an acknowledgement is received. At the time of writing, the only payment network with a public implementation is the Lightning Network (LN) [50] . We compare Teechain against the Lightning Network Daemon (LND) [37] . Both LN and Teechain can optionally batch transactions at the client side, merging multiple payments into a single payment before sending-at the cost of additional latency.
Security
Protocol correctness. Teechain achieves balance correctness: the ability for any user to unilaterally reclaim their channels' balances and unassociated deposits on the blockchain, regardless of what actions other users may take. We provide a brief outline of the correctness proof below-see Appendix A for the formal definitions and full proofs. We describe, using the Universal Composability (UC) framework [11] , an ideal functionality F Teechain , that captures the desired behavior of the Teechain protocols. We define an API for the Teechain functionality, e.g. procedures for handling deposits, channels creation, and payments. We show, through a series of steps starting at the real-world execution and ending in the ideal one, that the real and ideal worlds are indistinguishable to an external observer (or adversary). Finally, we prove in the ideal-world that F Teechain achieves balance correctness. Since the two worlds are indistinguishable, Teechain in the real-world maintains the same security properties, thus achieving balance correctness. Roll-back, replay and state forking attacks. Teechain mitigates against roll-back, replay and TEE state forking attacks: (i) it authenticates TEEs and establishes secure network channels using public/private keys generated inside the TEE to prevent messages from being shared between different TEE instances ( §4.1); (ii) it uses nonces or monotonic counters for message freshness ( §4.1 and §5.1); and (iii) it employs a fault tolerance mechanism that protects against Byzantine TEEs using committee chains ( §6). Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. DoS attacks against specific TEEs in the network are possible e.g. attackers can block communication between endpoints in the network, eclipse nodes to prevent blockchain access, or force failures along committee chains to degrade performance. To overcome this, Teechain protects against DoS attacks through asynchronous blockchain access and fault tolerance, ensuring DoS attacks do not affect fund safety. Side-channel attacks. Side-channel attacks violate data confidentiality inside a TEE [67, 71] . Such attacks are one instance of a TEE compromise, for which Teechain mitigates using committee chains ( §6). Our Teechain implementation also hardens against side-channel attacks using side-channel resistant libraries for sensitive data: (i) secp256k1, for elliptic curve operations [60] ; (ii) a side-channel resistant implementation of Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman [64] ; and (iii) a secure AES-GCM implementation using AES-NI [64, 22] . We use program analysis techniques [39] to verify the correct handling of sensitive data by these libraries. Experimental setup. We deploy Teechain on 33 SGX machines located in the UK, the US, and Israel. Fig. 3 shows the network configurations, machine locations, and hardware. We construct a payment channel between US and UK 1 . To evaluate outsourced channels, IL 1 acts as a non-SGX client that constructs an outsourced channel between US and UK 1 .
In all experiments, both parties in the channel employ the same fault tolerance strategy, i.e. both use committee chains of the same length because performance is bound by the slowest party. We vary the lengths n for m-out-of-n committee chains and note that the value of m does not affect channel throughput as all n committee members must replicate the state regardless. When batching transactions in Teechain, we batch for 100 ms before sending a single transaction. Teechain requires one round-trip for a payment to complete, while LN requires two. While Teechain can pipeline payments, LN only supports sequential transactions and must batch by default. Channel performance. Tab. 1 shows the average throughput and latency. LN achieves a maximum throughput of 1,000 tx/sec, with a latency of 387 ms (99th percentile at 420 ms). Without fault tolerance, with deposits only secured by a single committee member (n=1), Teechain has two orders of magnitude higher throughput with a latency of 86 ms (no batching). With two committee members (i.e. a single replica in Israel) for each party, the throughput of Teechain is 34× compared to LN, with similar latencies. Adding additional committee members to each party's committee chain only increases latency due to additional RTTs-throughput is unchanged. Using stable storage, performance is capped by the hardware counters, resulting in 10 tx/sec, which can be overcome by transaction batching. Teechain achieves between 135×-150× better performance than LN when batching. Channel operations. Tab. 2 shows the performance of chan- 
Performance of multi-hop payments
Next we evaluate the performance of Teechain multi-hop payments. We use the same machines as in §7.2. We answer two questions: (i) how does latency increase with the number of hops in a payment chain? and (ii) how does fault tolerance affect payment chain performance? Experimental setup. We construct 11 payment channels, all of which are transatlantic in the topology from Fig. 3 . We send transactions along the chain UK → US → IL → UK. For UK and IL, we split the payment channels equally between the machines to spread the load. All experiments use the same payment channel overlay network. All nodes in the multi-hop payment path use committee chains of the same length. Committee members are deployed in different failure domains, e.g. UK nodes are replicated to US and IL. Multi-hop latency. We measure the latency of multi-hop payments. We vary the number of hops and the number of committee members per committee chain for each TEE. Fig. 4 shows that LN scales linearly with the length of the chain, taking 1 sec to complete a payment across 2 hops (2 channels) and 7 secs for 11 hops. Teechain also scales linearly, but with different gradients: with no fault tolerance (i.e. committee chains of length 1), latency is about 2× that of LN. Using a single replica (i.e. committee chains of length 2 at each node), payments across 2 hops take 5 secs; payments across 11 hops take 23 secs. The 3×-4× overhead compared to LN is a due to the extra network round trips required for payment routing. Multi-hop throughput. To update all channels in a multi-hop payment consistently, both Teechain and LN do not pipeline multi-hop payments. Therefore, throughput is 1/latency. Teechain and LN thus batch transactions: throughput becomes the batch size divided by the latency to complete the payment. We compare throughput for Teechain and LN, with each Teechain node using two replicas. Teechain batches 135,000 tx/sec, while LN batches 1,000 tx/sec (see §7.2). With this, the throughput of Teechain for 2 hops is 14,062 tx/sec, while it is 3,649 tx/sec for 11 hops. For LN, throughput for 2 hops is 862 tx/sec, and 139 tx/sec for 11 hops. Teechain thus outperforms LN by between 16×-26× for between 2 and 11 hops, respectively. Discussion. Teechain requires three round trips to complete a payment, while LN requires only 1.5. Teechain must synchronize nodes off-chain with additional messages to support asynchronous blockchain access. In addition, Teechain is network-bound: replicating state to committee members increases latency.
Performance of payment networks
We also evaluate the performance of a Teechain payment network. We use the 30 machines located in the UK (Fig. 3) to conduct our experiments. We answer two questions: (i) how does the overlay network topology affect throughput? and (ii) how does fault tolerance affect throughput? Payment workload. As there exist no public micro-payment datasets, we use the transactions found in the Bitcoin blockchain. To adapt the Bitcoin transaction history, we filter out transactions that are not appropriate for replaying, such as those that spend to/from multi-signature addresses, or payments of value over a certain threshold (i.e. $100). For transactions with multi-input and output addresses, we choose only one. This results in a dataset of over 150 million payments from a source to a recipient address. Overlay network topologies. We construct two overlay payment network topologies: (i) a complete graph, in which all nodes in the network have a direct payment channel to Table 3 : Performance with hub-and-spoke topology all other nodes; and (ii) a hub-and-spoke topology, shown in Fig. 5 , in which the nodes are connected with 3 tiers of connectivity: tier 1 nodes have highest connectivity and tier 3 nodes lowest connectivity. We emulate wide-area network links by adding 100 ms latency between each machine. Experimental setup. To execute payments in the network, we assign Bitcoin addresses to the machines. For all payments, the machine assigned ownership over the sending address is responsible for issuing payments to the recipient addresses and corresponding machines. For the complete graph, we randomly and evenly distributing all Bitcoin addresses between the machines; for the hub-and-spoke graph, we distribute the addresses in a skewed fashion, with larger nodes being assigned more addresses than smaller nodes, as would be expected in a realistic deployment. We assign 50% of addresses to tier 1 nodes, 35% to tier 2, and 15% to tier 3. For each graph deployment, we compare the throughput with differently sized committee chains, for n = 1 to n = 3 committee members per deposit. All machines in the graph operate the same fault tolerance mechanism per experiment. Measurement begins when the first payment is issued, and ends when an acknowledgement for the last payment is received. As payments may fail, e.g. due to channel locking, upon receiving a failure notification, the payment is retried after a random amount of time between 100 ms-200 ms. To bound the degree to which out-of-order payments can be executed, we implement a sliding window of payments at each machine. Each machine issues W =1000 payments across the network in parallel, and waits for acknowledgements before moving the sliding window. Complete graph throughput. We execute the Bitcoin workload across several complete Teechain graphs. We vary the number of nodes in the deployment from 5 to 30 machines. Fig. 6 shows the achieved network throughput for each deployment. For all fault tolerant strategies, throughput scales linearly with the number of nodes. No fault tolerance (n = 1) performs best (2.2 million tx/sec with 30 machines), while the use of committee chains with n > 1 limits throughput (1 million tx/sec with 30 machines). There is little difference (9%) between n = 2 committee members per deposit and n = 3-with chain replication, throughput is bottlenecked by the time taken to replicate state. We note that, in a complete graph deployment, there is no need for multi-hop payments. Hub-and-spoke throughput. We execute the Bitcoin workload with the hub-and-spoke graph deployment from Fig. 5 . For multi-hop payments, we use the shortest possible pathif there are multiple, only one is chosen. Tab. 3 shows the results. Without fault tolerance (n = 1), the network achieves around 671 tx/sec, with an average payment latency of approx. 500 ms. With two comittee members per deposit (n = 2), throughput is around 210 tx/sec, with slightly higher latencies. The average number of hops per payment is around 3. Topology comparison. Payment throughput degrades significantly in the hub-and-spoke topology compared to the complete graph topology: more than 1000× when comparing the topologies with 20 machines and identical fault tolerance. This is a result of having to lock channels during multihop payments, forcing payments to compete for channels. To overcome this, we implement and evaluate two approaches to avoid locking contention: (i) dynamic routing to allow payments to execute across different paths in the graph, so as to route around contention; and (ii) temporary channels to allow concurrent payments between endpoints (see §5.2). Dynamic routing. Tab. 3 shows the throughput when payments are retried using different paths. When retrying payments, each machine first tries the shortest path, before incrementally trying longer paths. Throughput with dynamic routing degrades by between 50%-70% depending on fault tolerance. This is a result of longer multi-hop paths, locking up more channels; seen by more hops per payment on average. Temporary channels. Fig. 7 shows how throughput increases when tier 1 and 2 nodes in the hub-and-spoke graph support temporary channel creation. We avoid temporary channels for tier 3 nodes because it is unlikely that individual users are willing to deposit funds. As seen, throughput scales almost linearly with the number of temporary channels (G), for both no fault tolerance (n = 1 committee members) and one replica (n = 2). The results show diminishing returns as G increases because tier 3 nodes still suffer from congestion. Discussion. Locking channels during multi-hop payments creates contention: if high performance is required in a payment network, the graph must have high connectivity. Temporary channels can achieve this, however, performance is best when there is a direct payment channel between sender and recipient.
Blockchain cost
Payment networks place transactions on the blockchain to operate payment channels. We evaluate and compare: (i) the number of transactions that Teechain places onto the blockchain; and (ii) the associated blockchain cost.
We define the blockchain cost as the amount of data placed on the blockchain to open and close a payment channel. Unlike existing solutions, Teechain can assign multiple deposits to a single channel. For a fair comparison, we assume at most two deposits per channel. We abstract from particular blockchains and approximate cost by counting the pairs of public keys and signatures that must be placed onto the blockchain [9]: a cost of 1 means one public key and one signature. Tab. 4 shows the number of transactions and the blockchain cost. For all solutions but LN, the number of transactions and the blockchain cost is higher if one party unilaterally closes the payment channel. For Duplex Micropayment Channels (DMC) [15], the number of transactions required for each channel ranges from 2 to 1 + d + 2, where d ≥ 1 defines the DMC transaction chain length. Since each DMC transaction requires 2 public keys and 2 signatures, the associated cost is the number of transactions multiplied by 2. In LN, 4 transactions must be placed onto the blockchain, which contain both 6 public keys and 6 signatures, thus resulting in a cost of 6 across bilateral and unilateral termination.
For Scalable Funding of Micropayment Channels (SFMC) [9], the number of transactions required for each channel ranges from 2/n to (1 + i)/n + (1 + d + 2), where n is the total number of constructed payment channels and i ≥ 1 and d ≥ 1 define the funding and transaction chain's lengths. Since SFMC (i) constructs shared channel groups of size p > 2; and (ii) builds on DMC payment channels, it is possible that p parties do not collaboratively close payment channels. Since each SFMC transaction (i) requires p signatures and (ii) is shared between the n payment channels, this results in a blockchain cost of 2p/n for each payment channel if all parties collaboratively close payment channels; (1 + i)(p/n) + 2(1 + d + 2) for each payment channel if closed unilaterally.
Teechain constructs funding deposits using m-out-of-n transactions. If the channel has been funded by a single deposit and is settled off-chain, only one transaction is required, with the cost being 1 + (n/2)-the cost of a signature and public key to spend funds into the deposit address, and n public keys to specify the committee members. (We divide n by 2 as cost is defined in terms of both public keys and signatures together.) Otherwise, with two deposits assigned to a channel and on-chain settlement, Teechain requires 3 transactions, with the cost being the sum of the costs of the two funding deposits plus the settlement transaction. Discussion. Assuming a 2-out-of-3 multisignature construction for each funding deposit, Teechain places 25%-75% fewer transactions on the blockchain than LN, and is up to 58% more efficient when comparing blockchain cost for bilateral termination. For unilateral termination, Teechain is 50% more expensive due to larger multisignature transactions. For DMC and bilateral closure, Teechain places 50% fewer transactions and 37% less data on the blockchain than DMC. For unilateral closure and d > 1, Teechain outperforms DMC.
While Teechain outperforms SMFC for all values of i, d, p and n, in the case of closing channels unilaterally, SMFC places fewer transactions and less data onto the blockchain if n > 1 and p/n > 1 and if all parties agree on closing payment channels. This is because SFMC shares transaction numbers and costs across multiple parties and channels, however, at the cost of having to trust all involved parties. Teechain, on the other hand, does not require any assumptions about the correct behaviour of other parties.
Conclusion
Teechain is the first blockchain payment network to operate with asynchronous blockchain access and offer dynamic collateral assignment; funds can be assigned to payment channels at runtime, and channels can be created instantly, without blockchain writes. Teechain mitigates against Byzantine TEE failures through a novel combination of chain replication and threshold secret sharing. We evaluated Teechain using Intel SGX on the Bitcoin blockchain; our results show orders of magnitude performance gains compared to the state of the art. Finally, Teechain is blockchain agnostic and the protocols presented are independent of any specific TEE implementation. 
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A Teechain Protocol Correctness
We first intuitively define the security guarantees a payment network should provide (Appendix A.1) and describe the framework we use to construct our proofs (Appendix A.2 and Appendix A.3). We then formally prove that Teechain achieves the desired security properties for both channels (Appendix A.4) and multi-hop payments (Appendix A.5).
A.1 Security Guarantees
Teechain protects the funds of all participants in the network; despite what others may do, funds cannot be stolen or double spent. We define balance correctness to express intuitively: at any point during an execution, any party can unilaterally reclaim the channels' balances and unassociated deposits on the underlying blockchain, correctly reflecting all payments. Participants must be able to do so despite other's actions.
To formalize balance correctness, we first define an execution trace σ as a time-ordered series of events, where each event represents an operation and its return value; σ t denotes the prefix of σ until time t. For execution trace σ , user u, and time t, denote by L t (u) the balance of u in σ at time t on the blockchain, i.e., the sum of all the funds u has access to on the blockchain. In particular, L 0 (u) is the initial balance of u in σ . Denote by paid t (u) the accumulated sum of all payments made by u in σ t using Teechain channels; and by rcvd t (u) the accumulated sum of payments received by u in σ t . We thus define the perceived balance of u in σ at time t as perceivedBal t (u) = L 0 (u) + rcvd t (u) − paid t (u). We therefore define balance correctness as: Definition A.1 (Balance Correctness). A protocol satisfies balance correctness if for any prefix σ t , any well-behaved user u can unilaterally perform a series of operations, possibly interleaved with operations of other users, that will complete at finite time t ′ ≥ t, after which at any time
A well-behaved user, is one that faithfully follows the Teechain protocol, stores private keys used to communicate with the ledger securly, and does not leak them to other users in the system.
A.2 Ideal Functionalities and Simulation
Based Security
Simulation Based Proofs in the Universal-Composability Framework. Our formal proof for Teechain's channel protocol is based on the simulation based security framework Universal Composability (UC) [11] , which is a general purpose framework for modeling and constructing secure protocols. The model is based on a system of interactive Turing machines (ITMs), which are described based upon how they behave when receiving messages from other ITMs. The UC framework includes several ITMs: an environment E, which represents the external world. The environment chooses the inputs given to each party in the system, and observes the outputs. The framework also includes honest parties which follow the protocol, and a byzantine adversary A, that can corrupt users at will. Our model deals with an adaptive adversary, i.e., once a user is corrupted by A, it cannot be uncorrupted again until the end of the execution. We only define the security guarantees of honest users who follow the Teechain protocol.
The model also includes ideal functionalities, which act as idealized third parties, and implement some target specifications. We describe the behavior of such ideal functionalities based on an exposed API. This API exhibits the desired properties of the protocol. Ideal functionalities are also used in the real-world in order to represent network primitives and setup assumptions, and we use them to also model TEEs and the blockchain.
The proof that some protocol captures a specific property in the UC framework consists of the following stages:
1. Showing that any real-world execution is indistinguishable to the external environment E from an equivalent ideal-world execution. The proof is based on describing a simulator S in the ideal-world, which translates every adversary A in the real-world into a simulated attacker, which is indistinguishable to the environment. We do so in hybrid steps, and in each step we prove indistinguishability to the environment from the previous hybrid step.
2. Proving that the desired property of the protocol is maintained by the ideal functionality in the ideal-world.
Since the real-world and ideal-world are indistinguishable, if an attacker breaks a security guarantee in the real-world, then it will also break in the ideal-one. Thus, to prove a security guarantee holds in the real-world, it is sufficient to show it holds in the ideal one. Real-World Execution. The real-world Teechain channel protocol is identical to the one described in §4, except that we model the TEE and the ledger as ideal functionalities in the UC framework. This model is based on previous works that formalized the model, such as [55, 52, 5, 72, 40] . Ideal functionality F TEE . F TEE is an ideal functionality that models a TEE. This model is based on a version of the ideal functionality of Shi et al. [55] . User U is a Teechain user equipped with a TEE; prog is some program to run in an enclave; inp, outp, mem are the prog input, output and memory tape respectively. We further let sid as the session identifier and id is the enclave identifier. λ is a security parameter, and Σ, KGen are a signature scheme and its key generation algorithm respectively. Lastly, let PK TEE , SK TEE be a TEE's public-key and secret-key generated on the TEE's initialization.
An enclave is an isolated software container loaded with some program, in our case the Teechain protocol. F TEE abstracts an enclave as a third party trusted for execution, confidentiality and authenticity, with respect to any user that is part of the system, and in particular U that owns the TEE.
We now describe the API of F TEE . When initialized, F TEE generates a public secret key pair, and publicizes the public key, i.e., other users or TEEs can verify messages signed by other F TEE . This corresponds to an attestation service provided in the real-world execution. In addition, F TEE includes two calls, one for the installation of a new program prog, and the other one is a resume call for prog with some input.
The full API of F TEE is: F TEE is a setup assumption [11] that models the functionality offered by real-world TEEs, and in particular Intel's SGX. Due to this, F TEE uses a "real" signature scheme Σ, rather than an ideal version of it [12] . We assume that the signature scheme Σ used by F TEE is unforgeable under chosen attacks, and that all parties U i know PK TEE of all the other TEEs at the start of the execution. We note that in order to deal with real-world SGX vulnerabilities, we use different methods to mitigate such attacks (see §7.1).
Each user U is identified by unique id (simply denoted by U, or Alice and Bob), and a session id sid, obtained from the environment E [12]. Parties send messages to each other via authenticated channels, and the adversary A observes all messages sent over the network. We use the standard "delayed messages" terminology [12] : when a message msg is sent between users, msg is first sent to A (the simulator S), and forwarded to the intended user U, after the acknowledgment by S. Furthermore, S can delay messages between parties (i.e., asynchronous network), but eventually delivers them.
Note that F TEE is a local ideal functionality: a user U can talk to its F TEE without the messages being leaked to A.
However, when A corrupts a user it gets full access to the user's software and hardware. A can fully observe all the calls made to F TEE , but cannot tamper with the hardware's confidentiality, integrity and authenticity guarantees. Ideal functionality F Ledger . An ideal functionality that represents the ledger, i.e., the underlying blockchain. It maintains a single list, B, that represents the balances of all the users in the system. Each entry has a public key PK and any instruction to edit an entry requires the message to be signed by the corresponding private key, SK. Entries in B are in the form of (PK, amount), where amount is the current balance associated with the public key.
At the beginning of the execution, i.e. at t = 0, B contains initial entries with balances for the different public keys in the system. Also, some of the users also have the corresponding secret keys matching to the above public keys. F Ledger exposes two types of API calls, one is designed to transfer money from one entry in B to another, and one is designed to query F Ledger on existing entries.
The initial balances of all the public keys are stored in B 1 on receive (transfer, PK u , amount, σ , PK v ) from u: We model the real-world execution of Teechain in the (F TEE , F Ledger ) hybrid-model.
We are now ready to formally define balance correctness and perceived balance of any user using Teechain. Ideal-World Model. We define the ideal functionality F Teechain which captures Teechain's protocol. F Teechain is defined by an internal state of its internal variables, and by an API, which users can invoke. An invocation of an API call call by user u with arguments (arg1, arg2, . . . ) is denoted by: call u (arg1, arg2, . . . ).
The internal variables F Teechain maintains are described in Fig. 8 , a description of each call is described in Fig. 9 , and the complete algorithm is described in Alg. 6.
A.3 Indistinguishability of the real-world and ideal-world
We now move to show that the real-world execution is indistinguishable to the external environment from the ideal-world one. L Set of funds for the users using F Teechain . L captures the same functionality as F Ledger in the real-world. Entries are in the form of (u, amount), where amount is u's amount on the ledger. C Set of all open channels. We denote as u and v as two users
who have an open channel between them, amountU and amountV as u's and v's balances on the channel, c id as a unique channel identifier agreed between u and v prior to the opening, and isSymmetric as a boolean variable indicating the two different states a channel between two users can be in, i.e., whether the channel is open for both users or just the channel opening initiator. Entries in C are in the form of (c id , u, v, amountU, amountV, isSymmetric).
D Set of deposits associated with an open channel. We denote deposit id as a unique identifier given to each new deposit by F Teechain , amount as the amount of the deposit, u as the user who added the deposit, c id as the channel identifier the deposit is associated to (or ⊥ if the deposit is not associated with any channel), and isSymmetric as a boolean variable indicating if the deposit is associated to a channel, and both users are aware of this association. Entries in D are in the form of (deposit id, amount, u, c id , isSymmetric).
PendingDeposits This is a set of deposits in the process of dissociation from a channel, i.e., a user u who initiated a deposit dissociation and the dissociation is not approved yet by the other party of the channel. Entries in PendingDeposits: are in the format of (deposit id, u, isSymmetric).
PendingPayments Set of pending payments, i.e., if user u sent a payment to v, and v did not accept the payment yet. Entries in PendingPayments: are in the form of (c id , v, amount). c id is the channel id where the payment with amount amount is pending.
PendingChannels Set of channels in the process of being settled. In order to fully settle a channel both of its users need to settle it separately. If only one of the users settled the channel and other user did not, then this set will reflect it. Entries in PendingChannels: are in the form of (c id , v), were c id is the channel identifier and v is the party that did not settle the channel yet.
PendingLedgerPayments Set of pending payments waiting to be added to the ledger L. Entries in PendingLedgerPayments are in the form of (ledger payment id, u, amount), where ledger payment id is a unique id of the payment given by F Teechain , u is the recipient of the payment of amount amount. Proof. Let A be an adversary against the Teechain protocol. We construct an ideal-world adversary (the simulator) S, such that any environment E cannot distinguish between interacting with the adversary A and the Teechain protocol or with the simulator S and the ideal functionality F Teechain . We do so by a series of hybrid steps starting at the realworld execution of the protocol in the (F TEE , F Ledger ) hybrid -H 0 , and eventually reaching the ideal world. At each step we prove indistinguishability.
• Hybrid H 0 is the real-world execution in the (F TEE , F Ledger ) hybrid model.
• Hybrid H 1 behaves the same as H 0 except that S generates a secret-public key pair (SK, PK) for the signing scheme Σ and publishes the public key PK. When A wants to communicate with its F TEE , S faithfully emulates F TEE 's behavior, and records A's messages.
As S's simulation of the real-world protocol is done perfectly, the environment E cannot distinguish between H 0 (the real-world execution) and H 1 .
• Hybrid H 2 behaves the same as H 1 except for the following difference: whenever A wants to communicate with F Ledger , S faithfully emulates F Ledger 's behavior for A. As A's view in H 2 are perfectly emulated for him when interacting with the ledger, no environment E can distinguish between H 2 and H 1 .
• Hybrid H 3 behaves the same as H 2 except for the following difference: If A invoked its F TEE with a correct install message with program prog, then for every correct resume message S records the tuple (msg,σ ) from F TEE , where msg is the output of running prog in F TEE , and σ is the signature generated inside the F TEE , using the SK generated in H 1 .
Let Ω denote all such possible tuples. If (msg, σ ) ∉ Ω then S aborts, otherwise, S delivers the message to Bob (the party in the protocol that is not controlled by A).
We can argue that H 2 is indistinguishable from H 1 by reducing the problem to the EU-CMA of the signing scheme. If A does not send one of the correct tuples to the other party, then the other party's attestation (verification mechanism) will fail (but with negligible probability). Otherwise, E and A can be leveraged to construct an adversary that succeeds in a signature forgery.
The following calls are for user interaction with the ledger:
getLedgerBalance Upon receiving getLedgerBalance v (u) from any user v in the system, F Teechain returns the current entry in L indicating u's balance on the ledger.
acceptLedgerPayment Upon receiving this call from a user u in the system, F Teechain checks if u has a pending payment waiting to be reflected on the ledger L. If so, F Teechain changes L to reflect the payment.
The following calls capture the unilateral deposit handling of users:
addDeposit When receiving this call F Teechain adds a new deposit for user u.
removeDeposit User u can call this function to remove an unassociated deposit from the system and add the deposit's amount back on the ledger.
The last set of calls captures the logic of user interaction with other users and handle channels in the system: openChannel u invokes this call in order to initiate a channel opening between her and another user in the system.
acceptChannelOpen v can invoke this call to complete the channel opening process. This call can be invoked by the v after openChannel is invoked.
associateDeposit u can invoke this call in order to start the process of associating a deposit with a specific channel.
acceptAssociateDeposit v invokes this call to complete the process of associating the deposit deposit id. In the realworld execution v needs to make sure at this stage that the deposit is on the ledger.
dissociateDeposit Invoked by u to start dissociating deposit deposit id from a channel it is associated to.
acceptDissociate The second phase of dissociating a deposit from a channel, indicating that the other party in the channel accepted the dissociation.
ackDissociate Completes the dissociation of a deposit from a channel.
After the call ends successfully the deposit can be removed or associated again with another channel by u.
pay User u invokes this function to pay amount on channel c id to user v. When the call ends, F Teechain returns to u a payment id pending payment id.
receivePayment v invokes this function to accept a payment with payment id pending payment id made by another user on a channel. After the call ends, v's balance on the channel is increased by amount.
settleChannel u invokes this call to settle channel c id , i.e., receive his current balance from the channel on the ledger. When invoked, F Teechain generates a pending payment pending payment id which reflects u's balance on the channel and returns it to u. • Hybrid H 4 is the same as H 3 except that for the following difference: Whenever A delivers a signed message (by himself or from his F TEE ) to other users in the system signed by a secret key of Teechain's protocol, S behaves as in H 3 , i.e., S records the tuple (msg, σ ), and as in H 4 , S aborts if msg is not signed correctly by the corresponding secret key.
H 4 is indistinguishable from H 3 for the same reasons H 3 is indistinguishable from H 2 , i.e., otherwise E and A will be able to construct an adversary that can succeed in signature forgery.
• Hybrid H 5 is the ideal world execution, i.e., we map the calls in the simulated real-world to calls of S to F Teechain .
• newPayChannel Whenever a user sends newPayChannel to F TEE to create a new channel, S sends a openChannel message to F Teechain in the ideal world.
• newChannelAck Whenever newChannelAck is delivered to the recipient in the real-world, S invokes acceptChannelOpen to F Teechain .
• approvedDeposit Whenever a user invokes his F TEE with approvedDeposit after correctly transferring money on the ledger by invoking transfer to F Ledger , S invokes F Teechain with addDeposit, and records the returned deposit id.
• releaseDeposit Whenever a user invokes releaseDeposit to his F TEE , S calls removeDeposit to F Teechain with the corresponding pending payment id, and when the user calls transfer to F Ledger in order to place the tx on the ledger, S calls acceptLedgerPayment with the corresponding pending payment id.
• associateMyDeposit Whenever a user sends associateMyDeposit to another user in the system, S sends associateDeposit to F Teechain on that user's behalf.
• associateTheirDeposit Whenever a user invokes F TEE with associateTheirDeposit, the simulator S calls acceptAssociateDeposit with the corresponding deposit id deposit id.
• dissociateDeposit When a user correctly invokes his F TEE with dissociateDeposit, S calls dissociateDeposit.
• dissociatedDeposit When a user passes to his F TEE dissociatedDeposit message, S invokes 
return (success, deposit id) return (fail) return (fail) return (fail) dissociateDeposit to F Teechain .
• dissociatedDepositAck When a user invokes his F TEE with the message dissociatedDepositAck, S invokes ackDissociate in the ideal world.
• pay When a user invokes pay to F TEE , S invokes pay to F Teechain .
• paid Whenever a user passes paid to his F TEE , then S calls receivePayment.
• settle Whenever a user invokes settle to his F TEE , S invokes settleChannel commands on behalf of the user of the channel, i.e., for a channel between u and v them S will invoke settleChannel u and settleChannel v with the channel id c id .
In H 4 S can faithfully interact with F Teechain , while faithfully emulating A's view of the real-world. S can then output to E exactly A's output in the real-world. Thus, there does not exist any environment E that can distinguish between interaction with A and the Teechain channel protocol, from interaction with S and F Teechain .
Next, we define balance correctness in the ideal-world, and prove that F Teechain captures it.
A.4 Balance Correctness in the Ideal-World
We proved that for any environment E the ideal-world and the real-world executions are indistinguishable. Therefore, we can define the security interest of a payment channel in the ideal-world, and prove that the ideal-world execution achieves this desired property. Since both the ideal and the real world are indistinguishable to any environment, then both the definition of balance correctness, and the proof that it holds in the ideal-world will also hold in the real-world, thus concluding the proof. Notations and Definitions. We define our security goal to be balance correctness. Intuitively, this means that at any point in time, an honest user u can choose to settle a channel c id with another user v, even if v is corrupt or crashes arbitrarily, and receive her balance on the ledger without the ability of v or any other user w to affect the outcome.
To formally discuss balance correctness we first define a few notations and definitions:
An ret 2 ) , . . . , (op n , ret n )) is a series of events ev, each consists of a call op to F Teechain and its return value from F Teechain , ret. Each event might also result in the change of the state, i.e., the internal variables maintained by F Teechain .
L t (u) is the balance on the Ledger for user u at time t, i.e., if any user v calls getLedgerBalance v (u) at time t, then L t (u) is the returned value.
The initial time 0 is a time in an execution in the idealworld prior to any calls to F Teechain , with some initial value on the Ledger for the users in the run, e.g. users u, v, w with some initial values L 0 (u), L 0 (v), L 0 (w) respectively. σ t is the prefix of the execution σ from time 0 to t.
We denote payments t (u) be the set of all the amounts of successful pay calls to F Teechain from u that returned success during σ t : payments t (u) = {amount| ∃i, c id , v, amount, pending payment id ∶ ev i ∈ σ t , op i = pay u (c id , v, amount), ret i = (success, pending payment id)} Let paid t (u) be the sum of all payments in payments t (u), i.e., paid t (u) =
We denote receivedPayments t (u) to be a set of all the amounts of successful receivePayment calls to F Teechain from u that returned success during σ t :
ret j = (success, pending payment id)} Let receivedPayments t (u) be the sum of all such received payments in receivedPayments t (u) , i.e.
We are now ready to define the perceived balance in the ideal-world of user u.
Definition A.2 (Perceived Balance in the Ideal-World). The perceived balance of user u at time t is defined as
We are now ready to formally define balance correctness.
Definition A.3 (Balance Correctness). We say an algorithm satisfies balance correctness if for any prefix σ t for t ≥ 0, and for any well-behaved user u in the system, u can preform a series of operations, possibly interleaved with operations of other users, that will be completed in a finite time t ′ , after which at any time
A user u is honest or well-behaved if she follows the series of operations of the algorithm. We note that definitions definition A.3 and definition A.1 are equal to the environment E as the ideal-world and the real-world are indistinguishable to it. In order to show that F Teechain achieves balance correctness we need to show an algorithm, i.e., a series of operations that an honest user u has to preform in order to receive her perceived balance perceivedBal t (u).
We define the following sets, based on the internal variables of F Teechain :
1. All the deposit ids in D that are not currently associated with any channel at time t:
All the channel ids that have not been settled yet until time t. i.e.:
PendingChannels(c id ) ≠ u} 3. All the ledger payment ids ledger payment id that are associated with u and have not been placed on the ledger yet:
In order for u to receive her perceived balance perceivedBal t (u), we describe an algorithm, i.e., a series of calls to F Teechain .
1. u places a set of remove operations for each deposit id ∈ innerDeposits t (u):
Lemma 2. If u places the calls to F Teechain described in OPS 1 , then the return value of each call is success with some ledger payment id value ledger payment id.
Proof. The if statement in the removeDeposit algorithm (Alg. 6, Line 31) will be true for any deposit id deposit id ∈ innerDeposits t (u), which means that F Teechain will create a new ledger payment id ledger payment id and return success with ledger payment id (Line 35).
Lemma 3. User u has all the deposit ids deposit id ∈ innerDeposits t (u), such that she has the ability to invoke all the calls in OPS 1 .
Proof. OPS 1 is defined on a set of deposit ids deposit id such that there exists the entry D(deposit id) = (amount, u, ⊥, isSymmetric). The only option for such an entry to be generated, is if during σ t addDeposit u (amount) was invoked by u. When the call returns successfully, F Teechain returns (success, ledger payment id) to u. Thus, at time t, u already has all the deposit ids she needs in order to invoke the removeDeposit calls in OPS 1 .
2. u places a set of settle operations for each channel id c id ∈ innerChannels t (u):
OPS 2 = {settle u (c id ) |c id ∈ innerChannels t (u)} Lemma 4. If u places the calls to F Teechain described in OPS 2 , then the return value of each call is success with some ledger payment id value ledger payment id.
Proof. The if statement of the settleChannel algorithm (Alg. 6, Line 108) will be true for any c id in innerChannels t (u), thus F Teechain will return success with a ledger id ledger payment id (Line 123).
Lemma 5. User u has all the channel ids c id ∈ innerChannels t (u) such that she can invoke all the settleChannel calls in OPS 2 .
Proof. OPS 2 is defined as settleChannel calls for channel ids c id such that C(c id ) exists with user u. The only option for such an entry to be generated is if u invoked openChannel u (c id ) during σ t or invoked acceptChannelOpen u (c id ). Thus, at time t, u has all the channels ids she needs in order to invoke the settleChannel calls as defined in OPS 2 .
We proved that if u places the calls to F Teechain described in OPS 1 and in OPS 2 , then the return value of all these calls is (success, ledger payment id).
We denote by t 1 the time in which all the calls in OPS 1 ∪ OPS 2 return successfully.
Let us define a set of the return values for each operation in OPS 1 ∪ OPS 2 at t 1 :
u places a set of acceptLedgerPayment operations for each ledger payment id ∈ RET ∪ innerPendingLedgerPayment t (u):
Lemma 6. If u places the calls described in OPS 3 then F Teechain returns success for each of them.
Proof. All the pending payment ids of the calls described in OPS 3 are in PendingPayments as proved in Lemma 2 and Lemma 4, thus when u places acceptLedgerPayment with those pending pending payment id, F Teechain will return success.
Definition A.4 (balance correctness algorithm). The suffix for u in order to receive perceivedBal t (u) in the prefix σ t is:
We now move to show that by invoking the calls in Definition A.4, any user can receive her perceived balance, thus proving Theorem A.1.
Let innerChannelBalance t (u) be the set of all the capacities of all the open channels user u has with other users in the system at a given time t:
Let innerChannelBalanceSum t (u) be the sum of all the capacities in innerChannelBalance t (u):
Let innerDepositBalance t (u) be the set of the amounts of deposits that user u added and not removed, and are not associated with any channel at a given time t, i.e.:
Let innerDepositBalanceSum t (u) be the sum of all amounts in innerDepositBalance t (u):
Let innerPendingLedgerOpsSum t (u) be a set of all pending ledger operations from user u at a given time t, i.e.:
innerPendingLedgerOpsSum t (u) = = {amount|∃ledger payment id ∶ PendingLedgerPayments(ledger payment id) = (u, amount)} Let innerPendingLedgerOpsSum t (u) be the sum of all the amount of the ledger payment operations in innerPendingLedgerOpsSum t (u):
Let innerPendingDeposits t (u) be a set of all amounts of deposits in the process of being dissociated from a channel, i.e., all deposits in PendingDeposits:
Let innerPendingDepositsSum t (u) be the sum of all the amounts of pending deposits in innerPendingDeposits t (u):
amount Definition A.5. Let stateBalance t (u) be the balance of u, as defined by the internal state of F Teechain at a given time t, i.e.:
We begin by showing, that at any given time t the state balance of u is the same as the perceived balance as defined in Definition A.2. Proposition 1. At any execution σ the inner balance of u and the perceived balances are equal, i.e.:
Proof. We will prove this by induction on the execution σ . Inductive base. In the beginning of the execution σ at t = 0 all the internal variables of F Teechain are ⊥, i.e., for any internal variable f of F Teechain , and for any x: f (x) = ⊥. Thus:
And: stateBalance 0 (u) = perceivedBal 0 (u) Inductive step. Let us assume that in step i < t: stateBalance i (u) = perceivedBal i (u). We show that after the next event at step i + 1: stateBalance i+1 (u) = perceivedBal i+1 (u).
First we note that the inner balance as defined above does not change if F Teechain returns fail for any call, as the if statement in the beginning of each of its calls will cause it to return fail and change nothing, and in particular, not change L i (u).
We go over all the event types, each of them a result of a call to F Teechain , and show that for each of them, under the induction assumption for step i, it also holds for step i + 1, i.e.:
• getLedgerBalance This algorithm does not affect any variable of F Teechain .
• acceptLedgerPayment This algorithm takes amount from PendingLedgerPayments at time i and adds it to L i+1 (u), then it removes PendingLedgerPayments(ledger payment id), i.e.:
• addDeposit This algorithm deducts amount from L i (u) and adds an entry D(depositEntry) with amount, i.e.:
• removeDeposit This algorithm removes D(deposit id) and adds amount to PendingLedgerPayments(ledger payment id), i.e.:
• openChannel This algorithm does not affect the inner balance and therefore at step i+1 the inner and perceived balances are the same as in step i.
• acceptChannelOpen This algorithm does not affect the inner balance and therefore at step i + 1 the inner and perceived balances are the same as in step i.
• associateDeposit This algorithm changes the third argument of D(deposit id) to c id , which logically means that the deposit deposit id is now associated with channel c id .
By doing so, it moves amount from innerDepositBalanceSum i (u) to innerChannelBalanceSum i+1 (u), i.e.:
• acceptAssociateDeposit This algorithm does not affect the inner balance and therefore at step i + 1 the inner and perceived balances are the same as in step i.
• dissociateDeposit This algorithm deducts amount from the balance of u at time i in channel c id and adds it to PendingDeposits(deposit id) at i + 1, i.e.:
• acceptDissociate This algorithm does not affect the inner balance and therefore at step i + 1 the inner and perceived balances are the same as in step i.
• ackDissociate This algorithm removes the entry PendingDeposits(deposit id) and changes the third argument of D(deposit id) to ⊥, which logically means that the deposit is not associated with any channel:
• pay This algorithm deducts amount from the balance of u in channel c id at time i, thus changing stateBalance i (u), but it also deducts amount from perceivedBal i (u), i.e.:
• receivePayment This algorithm adds amount to the balance of u in channel c id at time i, thus changing stateBalance i (u), but it also adds amount to perceivedBal i (u), i.e.:
• settleChannel This algorithm takes the current balance of u in channel c id , and the sum of the deposits in the process of dissociation and deducts the total amount from u ands it as a pending ledger operation, i.e.:
This concludes the inductive step, we proved that stateBalance t (u) = perceivedBal t (u) for any time t during the execution σ .
Next we show that for any open channel c id the sum of the balances on both sides of the channel is less or equal to the sum of the deposits associated with the channel.
We first denote by deposits t (u) all the deposits that at a given time t are associated with a given channel c id :
PendingDeposits(deposit id) = ⊥}
We denote by depositsSum t (c id ) the sum of the amounts of the deposits that are associated at a given time t with channel c id :
We denote by channelCapacity t (c id ) the sum of the capacities of the two users u and v which have a channel between them with channel id c id at time t, i.e., for channel entry C(c id ) = (u, v, amountU, amountV, isSymmetric) we denote: channelCapacity t (c id ) = amountU + amountV Proposition 2. At any given time t during the execution σ the sum of the deposits associated with a given channel c id is always greater or equal to the balances of both users of the channel u and v, i.e.:
Proof. We will prove this by induction on the execution σ : Inductive base. At the initial step 0: ∀c id ∶ C(c id ) = ⊥. Therefore, there are no open channels in system at all. Inductive step. We assume that at step i the induction assumption holds for all entries in C, i.e., channelCapacity 0 (c id ) ≤ depositsSum 0 (c id ).
We will prove that at step i + 1 the proposition holds as well.
Let us look at all the operations in F Teechain . We note that the channel balance as defined above does not change if F Teechain returns fail for any call, as the if statement in the beginning of each of its calls will cause it to return fail does not change any internal variable of F Teechain . Thus, we go over all operations that return success:
• getLedgerBalance This call does not affect the balance of any channel in C.
• acceptLedgerPayment This call does not affect the balance of any channel in C.
• addDeposit This call does not affect the balance of any channel in C.
• removeDeposit This call does not affect the balance of any channel in C.
• openChannel In this call a new channel entry in C(c id ) is generated in the form of (u, v, 0, 0, ⊥). Thus, no deposit is associated at step i with channel c id , which means that depositsSum i+1 (c id ) = channelCapacity i+1 (c id ) = 0.
• acceptChannelOpen The only effect of this call on C(c id ) is that it changes the last argument of the entry C(c id ) from ⊥ to ⊤. This means that if at step i ?? holds then it also holds at step i + 1.
• associateDeposit In any successful call associateDeposit(c id , deposit id), F Teechain adds the deposit amount to either amountU or amountV, and changes the third argument of D(deposit id) to c id , i.e., at step i + 1: the amount of deposit id will be in deposits i+1 (u) , and depositsSum i+1 (c id ) = depositsSum i (c id ) + amount and
• acceptAssociateDeposit This call does not affect the balance of any channel in C as it only changes the last argument of D(deposit id) from ⊥ to ⊤.
• dissociateDeposit In this case amount is deducted from either amountU or amountV, and PendingDeposits(deposit id) entry is generated, i.e.,
• acceptDissociate This algorithm only changes PendingDeposits(deposit id) = (u, ⊥) to (u, ⊤) and does not affect the balance of any channel in C.
• ackDissociate This algorithm removes PendingDeposits(deposit id) and also changes the third argument of D(deposit id) to ⊥, thus the deposit was not in deposits i (u) at step i and is not in deposits i+1 (u) at step i + 1.
• pay This call deducts amount from either amountU or amountV in C(c id ).
In addition, in this call F Teechain adds a new entry to PendingPayments with a new generated pending payment id, i.e., PendingPayments(pending payment id) = (v, c id , amount.
This means that
• receivePayment In this call, F Teechain adds the amount in PendingPayments(pending payment id) to amountU or amountV in C(c id ), and then removes PendingPayments(pending payment id).
In order for the call receivePayment to return success, there has to be at step i an entry PendingPayments(pending payment id) in the form of (v, c id , amount). The only call in which F Teechain adds a new entry to PendingPayments is pay. This pay call needs to be called by either one of the parties in channel c id and amount is deducted in that call from amountU or amountV.
In addition, no other call deducts amount only from the right hand side of ??, which means that, channelCapacity i (c id ) + amount ≤ depositsSum i (c id ), channelCapacity i+1 (c id ) = channelCapacity i (c id ) + amount ⇒ channelCapacity i+1 (c id ) ≤ depositsSum i+1 (c id ).
• settleChannel This calls settles the channel c id , and can be called twice:
• If this is the second time settleChannel is called, then C(c id ) is removed, thus channelCapacity i+1 (c id ) is undefined at i + 1.
• If this is the first call to settleChannel, then after the calls ends at step i + 1, C(c id ) is updated s.t. amountU = 0. In addition, all the deposits s.t.
∃deposit id, isSymmetric ∶ PendingDeposits(deposit id) = (u, isSymmetric) are removed from D. The only deposits which have an entry in PendingDeposits are deposits with deposit id s.t. dissociateDeposit u (deposit id) was called during σ i , i.e., amount was already deducted from channelCapacity i (c id ) . This means that channelCapacity i+1 (c id ) = channelCapacity i (c id ) − amountU = amountV, depositsSum i+1 (c id ) = depositsSum i (c id ), thus, channelCapacity i+1 (c id ) ≤ depositsSum i+1 (c id ).
Finally, we prove that at any given time t, any user u has the ability to receive stateBalance t (u) by preforming the operations of the balance algorithm A.4.
Proposition 3. If a user u preforms the operations described in balance correctness algorithm A.4 as a suffix to the prefix σ t , interleaved with operation of other users, then for any time t ′′ ≥ t ′ such that op t ′′ = getLedgerBalance(u) and ret t ′′ = (success, amount), then amount = stateBalance t (u).
Proof. Let us look at the for sets of operations consisting the balance correctness algorithm (definition A.4): OPS u = (OPS 1 , OPS 2 , OPS 3 ).
• innerDepositBalance t (u) Let us look at OPS 1 .
This set consists of removeDeposit u calls to F Teechain for each deposit id ∈ innerDeposits t (u). innerDepositBalanceSum t (u) is defined as the sum of all those deposits. We proved in Lemma 2 that F Teechain returns (success, ledger payment id) for all these calls, and for each call adds the deposit amount amount to PendingLedgerPayments(deposit id). This means that at time t 1 when all calls in OPS 1 have been called then:
innerDepositBalanceSum t 1 (u) = 0 innerPendingLedgerOpsSum t 1 (u) = = innerPendingLedgerOpsSum t (u)+ + innerDepositBalanceSum t (u)
• innerChannelBalance t (u), innerPendingDeposits t (u) Let us look at OPS 2 . This set consists of settleChannel u (c id ) calls for each channel c id ∈ innerChannels t (u). innerChannelBalanceSum t (u) is defined as the sum of all u's open channels' balances, and innerPendingDeposits t (u) is defined as all the deposits in the process of dissociation from a channel. We proved in Lemma 4 that F Teechain returns (success, ledger payment id) for all these calls, and for each call adds u's channel balance amountU to PendingPayments(deposit id).
In addition OPS 2 does not change any existing entries in PendingLedgerPayments, therefore not changing innerPendingLedgerOpsSum t 1 (u). Thus, at time t 2 when all calls in OPS 2 have been completed: innerChannelBalanceSum t 2 (u) = = innerPendingDepositsSum t 2 (u) = 0 innerPendingLedgerOpsSum t 2 (u) = = innerPendingLedgerOpsSum t 1 (u)+ + innerChannelBalanceSum t (u)+ + innerPendingDepositsSum t (u)
• innerPendingLedgerOpsSum t (u) This set consists of acceptLedgerPayment u for each ledger payment ids ledger payment id that were the return values of the operations in OPS 1 ∪ OPS 2 in addition to all pending ledger operatios in innerPendingLedgerPayment t (u). This means that at a time t 3 when the calls in OPS 3 finish successfully (as proved in lemma 6): We note that t 3 is the time after all the operations in OPS u have been invoked and returned successfully, and that L t 3 (u) = stateBalance t (u). Therefore, if any user calls getLedgerBalance(u), F Teechain will return (success, amount) such that amount = stateBalance t (u).
We proved that at any point in time a user u can preform a series of calls to F Teechain and receive her inner balance. Since the inner balance is always equal to u's perceived balance and we showed that the ability of u to preform these operations fo not affect the perceived balance of other users in the system then any user can choose to preform these operations and receive their balance.
We recall Theorem A.1: [Balance Correctness Theorem] The ideal functionality F Teechain achieves balance correctness.
This concludes our proof to the theorem, and since the ideal-world and the real-world are indistinguishable to any external environment E then Teechain achieves balance correctness.
A.5 Multi-hop payments
Here we show that multi-hop payments satisfy balance correctness. As long as a multi-hop payment is not completed, the perceived balance of a user might be either post-payment or pre-payment (see §5). Thus, we define the perceived balance of a user in a multi-hop payment between u and v, where u is routing a payment of amount to v. For execution trace σ let: t 1 be the time in σ at which u enters stage lock of the protocol; t 2 > t 1 be the time in σ at which v enters stage lock; t 3 > t 2 the time in σ at which v enters stage idle; and t 4 > t 3 the time in σ at which u ends the protocol and enters stage idle. See Fig. 2 .
The users' perceived balances are as follows: For u, the perceived balance is: before t 1 as if amount was not paid; after t 4 as if amount was paid; between t 1 and t 4 either option is acceptable. For v, the perceived balance is: before t 2 as if amount was not paid; after t 3 as if amount was paid; between t 2 and t 3 either option is acceptable. The perceived balance of any intermediate party in the multi-hop payment does not change.
We prove Theorem A.1 by showing that every node p in a multi-hop payment (including u and v) can unilaterally reclaim their perceived balance at any point in time. We further show that if p settles, then all the channels of the multihop payment will always consistently settle the in either the pre-payment or post-payment state. Note that single channel payments do not interfere with multi-hop payments, as all the channels in the multi-hop payment are locked ( §5). Stage: idle. If p is in stage idle, then all other nodes of the payment are either in stage idle or lock. Node p and all other nodes can only obtain the pre-payment settlement transaction and subsequently stop the protocol. In this stage, the perceived balance of both u and v reflects the pre-payment state, thus satisfying balance correctness. Stage: lock. If p is in stage lock, all other nodes are either (i) in stage idle and in stage lock, or (ii) in stage lock and in stage sign. All nodes can only settle their channels at the prepayment state. Stage: sign. If p is in stage sign, all nodes are either (i) in stage lock and in stage sign, or (ii) in stage sign and in stage preUpdate. Case (i): If any node ejects, it settles its channels in the pre-payment state. This prevents progress and no node will reach the preUpdate stage. Node p can then similarly eject and settle its channels in the pre-payment state. Case (ii): Any node in the preUpdate stage might eject with τ. In this case, all channels will be settled in post-payment state. Stage: preUpdate. If p is in stage preUpdate, all nodes are either (i) in stage sign and in stage preUpdate, or (ii) in stage preUpdate and in stage update. Case (i): Any node in stage sign may eject and settle its channels in the pre-payment state. Node p can then present this settlement transaction to its TEE as PoPT and obtain pre-payment settlement transactions for its channels. Node p can also voluntarily eject and obtain τ. Placing τ onto the blockchain fails if one of the channels was already settled, in which case p can obtain settlement transactions for its channels as above. Case (ii): Any node can eject and settle the multi-hop payment with τ. With this, we conclude that Teechains multi-hop payment satisfy balance correctness: (i) if either u or v are in the initial idle stage, they are both only able to settle pre-payment; (ii) between stage lock and postUpdate, both u and v may settle their channels in either pre-payment or post-payment state. However, they will always consistently settle the same state; (iii) once reaching stage release, both u and v will settle the post-payment state. The balance for any intermediate nodes does not change during the course of the payment routing. Thus, all participants in the multi-hop payment protocol are always able to reclaim their perceived balance. This concludes our proof. We proved theorem A.1 and showed that the Teechain protocol (both channel and multihop payments) guarantee balance correctness.
